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Abstract 
Following a series of ad hoc interventions throughout 2007 and early 2008, the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 and the resulting liquidity crisis caused the German 
government to adopt a new framework for bank support. The Financial Market Support Act 
established a new fund, the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (Sonderfonds 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung, “SoFFin”), to provide up to €400 billion of guarantees on newly 
issued unsubordinated debt instruments of German financial institutions and German 
subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions. SoFFin also provided support through 
recapitalizations and asset purchases, in addition to guarantees. The scheme was extended 
multiple times before the issuance window closed initially on December 31, 2010. A 
subsequent reactivation of the scheme in 2012 extended this issuance window to December 
31, 2015. The total volume of guarantees provided through SoFFin peaked at €174 billion in 
the third quarter of 2010. By the end of 2013, there were no guarantees outstanding and 
none had been triggered. €2.15 billion in fees were collected as a result of the program. 




1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs.  
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 






At a Glance  
German banks began to experience losses from 
the financial crisis in mid-2007 due to their 
exposure to the subprime mortgage market in 
the United States. This led the German 
government to provide assistance on an ad hoc 
basis to three banks throughout 2007 and early 
2008. Once Lehman Brothers failed in 
September 2008, causing significant liquidity 
shortages in the interbank market, the German 
government recognized the need for a 
framework to preserve financial stability and 
provide support to banks.  
As a result, the German parliament passed the 
Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act 
(FMStFG) on October 18, 2008. FMStFG called 
for a new fund, the Financial Market 
Stabilization Fund (SoFFin). SoFFin would 
provide support to distressed German financial 
institutions through guarantees, 
recapitalizations, and asset purchases. 
Funding for the guarantee program was 
initially capped at €400 billion. Guarantees 
could be provided on interbank loans or bank-
issued debt with a maturity of 36 months or 
less (60 months in exceptional circumstances) 
issued by German financial institutions (including insurance companies and pension funds) or 
German subsidiaries of foreign institutions. Germany imposed a fee based on debt maturity and the 
risk profile of the issuing institution.  
The German government extended the scheme multiple times, before the issuance window for new 
guarantees initially closed on December 31, 2010. A subsequent reauthorization of the scheme in 
2012 in response to the European sovereign debt crisis extended this window to December 31, 2015. 
The total volume of guarantees peaked at €174 billion in the third quarter of 2010. No guarantee was 
ever triggered in connection with the scheme, and the German government collected €2.15 billion in 
fees. 
Summary Evaluation 
Assessments of SoFFin as a whole generally agree that a systematic framework was necessary and 
that the program was successful in maintaining financial stability in Germany. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To restore confidence and access to liquidity 
amongst German lenders. 
Announcement Date  October 13, 2008 
Operational Date October 27, 2008 






Originally until December 31, 
2009; extended until 
December 31, 2010 and later 
December 31, 2015 
Program Size Initially, €400 billion; later 
temporarily reduced to €300 
billion 
Usage  Peaked at €174 billion 
Outcomes €2.15 billion in fees collected. 
A substantial amount of the 
guarantees was provided to 
Hypo Real Estate, which was 
nationalized in 2009 
Notable Features Part of a single fund for 
granting guarantees, 
providing recapitalizations 
and making asset purchases 
SoFFin Guarantee Scheme (Germany) 
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SoFFin Guarantee Scheme:  Germany Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in 
LCU converted to USD) 
$3,431.2 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in 
LCU converted to USD) 
$41,587 in 2007 




Sovereign credit rating 
(5-year senior debt) 
 












Size of banking system 
 
$4,035.4 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking system 
as a percentage of GDP 
 
117.6% in 2007 




Size of banking system 




Data not available 
 
 
5-bank concentration of 
banking system 
 
85.4% of total banking assets in 2007 
85.6% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
Foreign involvement in 
banking system 
11% of total banking assets in 2007 
12% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




of banking system 
 
Data not available in 2007 
35.4% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Regulation & Supervision 
Survey 
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Existence of deposit 
insurance 
90% insurance up to $28,000 in 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $133,333 in 
2010 
 
Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset; 
OECD, “Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and 









In late 2007 and early 2008, German financial institutions began to struggle as a result of 
their exposure to the U.S. subprime mortgage market. During this period, the government 
provided substantial support on an ad hoc basis to three banks: one medium-sized private 
bank and two state-owned Landesbanken.3 This support took the form of capital injections, 
credit lines, and guarantees (Hüfner 2010). 
Throughout late 2007 and 2008, the interbank lending market faced increasing pressure. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 caused interbank markets to dry up, 
and banks across Europe faced liquidity crises. To address this, Euro-area countries 
convened at an emergency summit on October 12, 2008. The summit resulted in a joint 
action plan calling in part for national governments to “improve market functioning over 
longer term maturities” through the introduction of guarantee programs for bank senior 
debt issuance (Summit of the Euro Areas Countries 2008).  
In Germany, the collapse of the interbank market caused Hypo Real Estate Group to run into 
liquidity problems and the government began to worry that Hypo might fail. As a result, the 
financial industry provided €50 billion in guarantees to Hypo in early October 2008, €35 
billion of which was secured by a government re-guarantee (Bleuel 2009). At this point, the 
German government recognized the severity of the crisis in the interbank market and the 
limitations of providing support on an ad hoc basis and moved to create a systematic 
framework for bank support (Bleuel 2009). 
Program Description 
On October 18, 2008, the German Parliament passed the Financial Market Stabilization Fund 
Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz, or FMStFG), which introduced a new 
framework for financial stability. FMStFG established a Financial Market Stabilization Fund 
(Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or SoFFin) which would be administered by the 
newly created Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or FMSA) (Pleister 2011). SoFFin could issue up to €100 billion 
in debt to fund itself. 
FMStFG allowed for three stabilization measures under SoFFin: guarantees, 
recapitalizations, and asset purchases. FMStFG initially capped the total volume of 
guarantees under SoFFin at €400 billion, and at €80 billion for capital support and asset 
purchases combined (International Monetary Fund 2011). German financial institutions 
(including insurance companies and pension funds), subsidiaries of foreign institutions, and 
special purpose vehicles were eligible to receive guarantees. Eligible institutions had to 
specifically request guarantees, which could be issued for interbank loans or bank-issued 
debt. In order to be eligible, debt instruments were required to have a maturity of 36 months 
 
3 IKB, WestLB, and SachsenLB. 
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or less, though maturities of up to 60 months were eligible in special circumstances (Petrovic 
and Tutsch 2009). The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity 
requirements for eligible debt. FMStFG required that the German government charge a fee 
for guarantees. The base fee was 50 basis points, and liabilities with a maturity greater than 
one year were charged an additional fee based on the issuing institution’s credit default swap 
(CDS) spread for senior debt issuance (European Commission 2008c). These fees were 
increased by 20bps to 40bps in June 2010 consistent with European Commission guidance 
calling for increased fees for programs extending beyond June 30, 2010 (European 
Commission 2010).  
Every participating institution was required to submit a business model for approval to the 
German government. Upon review, SoFFin could stipulate that risky lines of business be 
abandoned or curtailed (European Commission 2008c). In addition, institutions were 
prohibited from advertising participation in the guarantee scheme in order to avoid 
distorting competition with other banks (Petrovic and Tutsch 2009). 
FMStFV, the statute detailing SoFFin, further stipulated that guarantees could only be 
provided to solvent financial institutions. In practice, the German government restricted 
participation to institutions with a Tier-1 ratio of at least 7%. Exceptions could be made only 
if the institution in question committed to reaching the 7% threshold within three months 
(European Commission 2008c). 
The European Commission approved the SoFFin stabilization measures, ruling that though 
they constituted State Aid, they were permitted under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC, which 
permits State Aid that remedies a serious disturbance in a Member State’s economy 
(European Commission 2008b).4 
Both FMSA and SoFFin were intended to be temporary. The authority to issue guarantees 
under SoFFin was supposed to expire by December 31, 2009, presuming the crisis lasted that 
long (European Commission 2008b). As German banks continued to face difficulties 
accessing funding on the capital markets, Germany applied to the EC to extend the SoFFin 
rescue measures multiple times. The EC approved these extensions until the window for 
issuing guarantees under SoFFin initially closed on December 31, 2010 (European 
Commission 2010). A subsequent reauthorization of the scheme in 2012 in response to the 
European sovereign debt crisis ultimately resulted in the issuance window being extended 
until December 31, 2015. 
Outcomes 
FMStFG initially capped the total volume of guarantees through SoFFin at €400 billion, and 
over the course of its existence the total volume peaked at €174 billion in the third quarter 
of 2010 (International Monetary Fund 2011). The total volume of guarantees over time can 
 
4 Note that once the treaty was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 
December 1, 2009, the relevant state aid provision was renumbered to Article 107(3)(b). Later decisions on 
extensions regarding SoFFin referenced the new article numbers. 
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be seen in Figure 1 below. A substantial amount of the guarantees was provided to Hypo Real 
Estate, which was nationalized in 2009 (represented in Figure 1 as “Guarantees to 
HRE/FMS”). 





Source: International Monetary Fund 2011. 
 
When the window for issuing guarantees initially closed at the end of 2010, only €64 
billion of guarantees remained (International Monetary Fund 2011). By the end of 2013, 
there were no guarantees outstanding and none had been triggered. Over the course of the 
scheme, the German government collected €2.15 billion in fees for guarantees under 
SoFFin (Detzer and Hein 2016).  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The SoFFin guarantee scheme was part of a package passed by the German 
government in response to the financial crisis. 
The German government passed a package of crisis response measures, which entered into 
force on October 18, 2008. The backbone of the package was SoFFin, which was permitted 
to assume guarantees, inject capital, and temporarily acquire assets (FMStFG 2008).  
2. The Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act provided authority to grant 
guarantees. 
The Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz, or 
FMStFG) established the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (Sonderfonds 
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Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or SoFFin) on October 17, 2008. Section 6 of FMStFG specifically 
authorized SoFFin to provide guarantees (FMStFG 2008).  
3. The European Commission approved the SoFFin guarantee scheme under Article 
87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty. 
On October 27, 2008, the European Commission (EC) ruled that guarantees provided by 
SoFFin were allowed under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, which permits state aid to 
“remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” (European Commission 
2008b). Following a number of early amendments to the scheme, most of which concerned 
the recapitalization scheme, the German government re-notified the EC of the scheme and a 
new decision was announced on December 12, 2008, which replaced the initial approval. 
The new decision also permitted the guarantees under Article 87(3)(b) (European 
Commission 2008c). As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the Guarantee 
Scheme in such a way as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain 
program features. 
4. FMStFG initially capped the volume of guarantees SoFFin could provide at €400 
billion. 
According to FMStFG, the total volume of guarantees SoFFin could provide was capped at 
€400 billion. This amount was specifically separated from the cap for SoFFin’s 
recapitalization measures and asset purchases, which was set at €80 billion for both 
measures combined (FMStFG 2008). 
The amount of guarantees that could be issued by SoFFin was temporarily reduced to €300 
billion in connection with the reauthorization of the scheme in 2012. 
5. SoFFin acted as a fund to finance bank support measures including the guarantee. 
SoFFin could issue up to €100 billion in debt to fund itself. 
In addition to establishing SoFFin, FMStFG also established the Federal Agency for Financial 
Market Stabilization (Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or FMSA) to manage 
SoFFin. When FMStFG was passed, the FMSA was established as a legally dependent 
institution in Germany’s central bank, Deutsche Bundesbank. In July 2009, the FMSA became 
an independent institution under the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMSA n.d.). According to 
the IMF, the FMSA is now an independent organization under the Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland-Finanzagentur GmbH and under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance (BMF). Decisions are subject to scrutiny by the BMF. The BMF reports the FMSA’s 
activity to a committee of the German parliament (International Monetary Fund 2011). 
6. German financial institutions (including insurance companies and pension funds), 
German subsidiaries of foreign institutions, and special purpose vehicles were 
allowed to obtain guarantees through SoFFin provided that they met minimum 
capital requirements. 
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FMStFG permitted FMSA and SoFFin to provide guarantees to German financial institutions 
(including insurance companies and pension funds) and German subsidiaries of foreign 
financial institutions, and to special purpose vehicles that had assumed the risk positions of 
an eligible institution (FMStFG 2008). Stolz and Wedow suggest that the ability to transfer 
securities to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in exchange for bonds issued by the SPV and 
guaranteed by SoFFin would allow an institution to hold government-guaranteed bonds 
instead of volatile assets on its balance sheet, reducing capital requirements. They conclude 
that this scheme would serve two purposes: providing institutions with collateral that could 
in turn be used to access central bank liquidity, and freeing up capital (2010).5 
FMStFV, the statute detailing SoFFin, further stipulated that guarantees could only be 
provided to solvent financial institutions. In practice, the German government restricted 
participation to institutions with a Tier-1 capital ratio of at least 7%. Exceptions could be 
made only if the institution in question committed to reaching the 7% threshold within three 
months (European Commission 2008c). 
In order to receive a guarantee through SoFFin, an eligible institution had to request 
stabilization measures. Section 4 of FMStFG stipulated that there was “no legal entitlement 
to benefits of the fund,” and that stabilization measures, including guarantees, would only be 
approved once the Federal Ministry for Finance assessed “the significance of the respective 
financial-sector enterprise covered by the Stabilization measure to financial-market 
stability, the urgency and the principle of the most effective and economical deployment of 
Fund resources possible” (FMStFG 2008). 
7. SoFFin could provide guarantees for newly issued unsubordinated debt 
instruments.  
Under the SoFFin framework, the German government could provide guarantees for new 
bonds and liabilities, including debt capital and non-Tier 1 and -Tier 2 capital (European 
Commission 2008c). Covered bonds were also eligible. 
8. Initially, the maturity for eligible liabilities was capped at 36 months, or 60 months 
in exceptional circumstances. 
When the guarantee scheme began, eligible liabilities were required to have a maturity of 36 
months or less (European Commission 2008c). The Financial Markets Stabilization 
Amendment Act (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz, “FMStErgG”), passed in 
April 2009, lengthened this maturity limit and allowed SoFFin to guarantee liabilities with a 
maturity of up to 60 months (FMSA n.d.). According to the amended act, guarantees could be 
granted for liabilities with a maturity of over 36 months, “only in justified, exceptional cases 
and for a maximum of one third of the guarantees granted to an enterprise” (FMStFG 2008). 
 
5 No guarantees were ever provided to special purpose vehicles (Pleister 2011); for more information on the 
rules governing guarantees to special purpose vehicles, see Stolz and Wedow 2010. 
707
SoFFin Guarantee Scheme Simon
 
 
The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for 
eligible debt. 
In connection with the reauthorization of the scheme in 2012, covered bonds with maturities 
of up to 84 months became eligible. 
9. There does not appear to have been any restrictions on the currency of eligible 
liabilities. 
Program documents do not specify any restrictions on the currencies eligible to participate 
in the scheme. 
10. There does not appear to have been a participation limit imposed on financial 
institutions. 
Program documents do not specify any limitations on an individual institution’s 
participation in the scheme. 
11. Participants were charged a fee for guarantees based on maturity of debt and 
creditworthiness. 
FMStFG stipulated that a fee would be charged for guarantees, and FMStV enumerated the 
fee structure, which aligned with recommendations from the European Central Bank issued 
on October 20, 2008. The base annual fee was 50 basis points; liabilities with a term of over 
a year were charged a risk premium that corresponded to the participating institution’s CDS 
spread for senior debt, which cannot be less than the median of the financial institution’s 
five-year credit default swap spread between January 1, 2007, and August 31, 2008 
(European Commission 2008c). In other words, the fees would be calculated as follows: 
𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 =  𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ×  (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑒𝑒 +  𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒) 
Participating institutions providing collateral to SoFFin in connection with the issuance of a 
guarantee could have the base fee reduced from 50 bps to 25 bps.  
As conditions improved, Germany increased these fees in order to incentivize banks to scale 
back and ultimately end their participation in the scheme. Fees were increased by 20 basis 
points for banks with a rating of A+ or A, 30 basis points for banks rated A-, and 40 basis 
points for banks rated below A- (European Commission 2010). This met a stipulation by the 
EC that no extensions to guarantee schemes would be approved beyond June 30, 2010, 
unless the fees were increased above the 2008 guidelines (Stolz and Wedow 2010). 
12. Participating institutions had to agree to a number of conditions, including 
oversight of business models by German authorities and restrictions on marketing. 
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit 
guarantee programs called for the inclusion in programs of a set of safeguards “to 
minimize…distortions and the potential abuse of the preferential situations of beneficiaries 
brought about by a State guarantee” and “to avoid moral hazard.” This guidance did not 
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specify exactly what safeguards a program should include, but required “an adequate 
combination” of elements including restrictions on advertising based on the guarantee, 
balance sheet growth, share buybacks and executive compensation (European Commission 
2008a). 
By participating in the SoFFin guarantee scheme, institutions agreed to a number of 
conditions. Every participating institution was required to submit a business model for 
approval to the German government. Upon review, SoFFin could stipulate that risky lines of 
business be abandoned or curtailed (European Commission 2008c). In addition, institutions 
were prohibited from advertising participation in the guarantee scheme in order to avoid 
distorting competition with other banks (Petrovic and Tutsch 2009). 
German authorities abandoned as unnecessary an initial proposal that participants agree to 
restrictions on balance-sheet growth. Certain other conditions such as restrictions on 
compensation that applied to SoFFin’s recapitalization scheme did not apply to the 
guarantee program. 
13. The issuance window was initially slated to close on December 31, 2009, but was 
extended until December 31, 2010, and, following a reauthorization of the 
program in 2012, until December 31, 2015. 
According to FMStFG, guarantees could only be issued until December 31, 2009. However, 
that end date was conditional on the crisis lasting that long and the German government 
retained the power to close the issuance window early (European Commission 2008c). 
Though the German government was hopeful that improved conditions in the interbank 
market would render the guarantee scheme unnecessary by the end of 2009, FMStFG 
recognized that any prolongations of the scheme would need to be approved in accordance 
with State Aid rules. The EC required that they be notified six months before any extension 
of the scheme (European Commission 2008c). In fact, the scheme, with amendments, was 
extended and approved by the EC multiple times before the issuance window closed initially 
on December 31, 2010. 
III. Evaluation 
Although not focused on the guarantee scheme specifically, assessments of the FMSA and 
SoFFin are generally positive and argue that the stabilization measures were effective at 
maintaining financial stability in Germany. Pleister argues that the concerted State 
assistance framework, as opposed to the earlier ad hoc interventions, was successful in 
rescuing German banks and “buttressed system stability over the short term,” (2011). In a 
technical note assessing Germany’s crisis management arrangements, the IMF similarly 
noted that the availability of guarantees through SoFFin and FMSA successfully relieved 
funding constraints on the interbank market (2011). 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
Act on the Establishment of a Financial-Market Stabilization Fund – English translation of 
FMStFG, legislation authorizing SoFFin. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Act_on_the_Establishment_o
f_a_Financial-Market_Stabilization_Fund_0.pdf. 
National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial Crisis – ECB Legal Working 












European Commission Decision June 23, 2010 (C(2010)4261 final) – final EC approval of 




Fund for the Stabilization of the Financial Market starts its operations in Germany 
(10/27/2008) – press release announcing that SoFFin has commenced operation. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fund_for_the_Stabilization_
of_the_Financial_Market_starts_its_operations_in_Germany.pdf. 
Key Academic Papers 
The German banking system and the global financial crisis: causes, developments and policy 
responses (Bleuel 2009) – paper providing context for financial crisis in Germany and 
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analyzing policy responses, including SoFFin. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bleuel_2009.pdf. 
The Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation in Germany: from Rescuing to 
Restructuring (Pleister 2011) – paper examining the creation of FMSA and its role during the 
crisis. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Pleister_2011.pdf. 
Financialisation and the crises in the export-led mercantilist German economy (Detzer and 
Hein 2016) – paper examining German financial sector and crisis; see in particular section 4. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Detzer_and_Hein_2016.pdf. 
The Design of Government Guarantees for Bank Bonds: Lessons for the Recent Financial 
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